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What is more terrifying than to witness the rise of a demagogue 
through democratic means? In a democracy, this kind of outcome is a 
nightmare. The book shows in clear terms the two authors’ apprehen-
sion towards such possibilities. The authors begin with the question of 
“whether democracy is in danger?”. The question does not only inquire 
into the state of democracy but also highlights the plausibility of the 
general public and those belonging to the “elite” not realizing the im-
pending dangers being faced. The book’s argument is constructed based 
on a historical analysis on threats against democracy in many parts of 
the world, including the current state of affairs in the US.
Most people recognize the downfall of democracies around the 
world in the hands of military leaders. The first wave of democracy 
(1828–1926) failed amidst the trend of fascism in Italy and Germany 
and the rise of communism (1922–1942). The second wave of democ-
racy (1943–1962) tumbled against the rise of military regimes where, 
in Latin America, they were known as the bureaucratic authoritarian 
regimes (1958–1975). This establishes a pattern of the rising and fall-
ing of democracies, but the question remains on whether the “third 
wave” of democracy–originating in Portugal and gradually spreading 
to Greece, Spain, Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Eastern bloc 
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countries throughout the 1980s (Huntington 1991)–has reached its end; 
where are we in relation to that circumstance?
In How Democracies Die, Levitsky and Ziblatt warn the readers on 
the impending threats against democracy. These threats constitute 
populist regimes and the electoral victories of extremist factions in 
Hungary, Turkey, Poland, Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, and 
the US. Unlike military leaders who typically undermine democracy 
through sudden and radical means, these autocrats enter into power 
and ‘hijack’ democracy through legal means. The destructive outcome 
is supposedly more impactful as the general public is not always aware 
of such a calamity and therefore continues to maintain the sense that 
the country remains democratic. The elites undergo the same state 
of mind and would often hand out power in political transitions to 
those dangerous to democracy. Protecting democracy from disastrous 
circumstances requires both elites and the general public being able to 
recognize how to identify potential autocrats and their way of hijacking 
democracy with a relatively similar strategy.
However, it is difficult to identify potential autocrats whose back-
ground lacks experience in public office and does not explicitly show 
antidemocratic tendencies. Levitsky and Ziblatt outlines a set of point-
ers akin to a litmus test to identify potentially authoritarian leaders. 
These pointers include (1) rejection of (or lack of commitment to keep) 
democratic rules; (2) denial against the legitimacy of their opposition; 
(3) tolerance or encouragement of violence; and (4) readiness to restrict 
the civil liberties of their opposition, including the media. Fulfilling 
one or more of these pointers must be handled with caution.
Unfortunately, the US–who had traditionally held the claim as one 
of the oldest and most successful democratic nations–has failed to pre-
vent the election of an autocrat. In this book, Levitsky and Ziblatt put 
great attention towards the status of American democracy. The election 
of Donald Trump in 2016 had led many to assume that democracy in 
the US is under threat. Such thoughts came into being as Trump had 
repeatedly demonstrated all four pointers listed above throughout his 
campaign leading up to his victory: (1) his weak commitment to uphold 
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democratic norms by continuously putting into question the legitimacy 
of the election that he regarded as “unfair”; (2) rejecting the legitimacy 
of his adversary by branding Hillary as a criminal, or describing Obama 
as a Kenyan-born Muslim; (3) advocating for violence perpetrated by 
his supporters against those who oppose his policies; and (4) setting in 
place limits that restrict the civil liberties of his adversaries, of which 
includes threatening to imprison Hillary and openly threatening news 
media that shines a negative light on Mr. Trump. 
Institutionally, the US has an established constitution and electoral 
system to safeguard its democracy. However, in reality, these ‘gatekeep-
ing’ measures do not always work sufficiently. The gatekeepers include 
political parties and their politicians, along with the general public act-
ing as voters; in the American context, these gatekeepers have failed to 
function due to internal and external forces. Internally, the parties and 
the politicians had finally allowed an autocrat to enter the fray due to 
misguided perceptions that they could tame the figure and change the 
status quo. Furthermore, ideological similarities become paramount to 
such actions–a condition where the autocrat’s agenda are in line with 
the platform of the political party and the goals of the politicians them-
selves. In such a condition, the integrity of these gatekeepers is held 
under stress–to what extent are they willing to sacrifice their pragmatic 
ends and ally with their adversaries in order to save democracy. 
Externally, the gatekeepers of American democracy have been weak-
ened by two factors. One, the political arena is open for all and indeed 
very flexible. This is reflected by the large amount of funds circulating 
in US elections, with Donald Trump as one of these oligarchs elected 
as president. This is contrary to Winters’ argument that in a civil oli-
garchy model such as the US, oligarchs do not involve themselves in 
political competitions. Their way of maintaining wealth is by delegating 
such tasks to other actors such as accountants, investors, lawyers, and 
lobbyists (Winters 2011). Two, the emergence of numerous ‘alternative 
media,’ operating on both the social and mainstream media, acts as 
vehicles for wannabe autocrats to gain public attention. This is apparent 
in Trump’s anti-immigrant and white supremacist rhetoric that domi-
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nated the news media as well as the internet in the 2016 election. His 
victory shows that the media has the ability to instill values within an 
individual. These values would then integrate the individual into the 
larger public (Herman and Chomsky 1988).
Aside from identifying potential authoritarian despots, Levitsky and 
Ziblatt push for the need to discover how autocrats plan on hijacking 
democracy. These ‘strategies’ include: One, the capture or removal of 
‘referees’, referring to law enforcement and justice institutions. This 
is reflected in Trump’s firing of FBI director James Comey due to his 
investigations relating to the supposed Russian involvement in the 2016 
election, in addition to the firing of federal attorney Preet Bharara for 
investigating the claims regarding Trump’s money laundering scheme. 
Two, eliminating key political players that could subvert or threaten his 
claim to power, including his rhetoric against Hillary Clinton and the 
media such as New York Times, Washington Post, and CNN, accusing 
them of false reporting. During the first half of his presidency, Trump 
issued an executive order allowing federal agencies to halt funding for 
cities that provide sanctuary for illegal immigrants. The last strategy 
involves changing the rules so as to discourage potential opponents, 
such as Trump proposing to remove congressional member’s ability to 
filibuster. Trump also formed the Presidential Advisory Commission on 
Election Integrity with the intent to create Voter IDs that consequently 
makes it difficult for minority groups to vote–mirroring the attempts 
to restrict voting rights in the Jim Crow era that ended with the Civil 
Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act. One last strategy that Trump 
has not seem to have done is crisis utilization. Crisis situations may be 
taken advantage of to issue popular decrees that often leads to attempts 
at reducing restrictions towards presidential powers.
As it stands, America’s democratic quality remains one of the best 
in the world, with systems and political entities that may not exist in 
other governments. Sociologically, this condition is made possible by 
the American social roots formed by Anglo-America in the ‘new world’ 
under the notion of freedom and equality, two things that they could 
not obtain in Europe (Tocqueville 1863). Furthermore, Levitsky and 
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Ziblatt note that US democracy has ‘unwritten rules’ that is fundamen-
tal to the safekeeping of democracy.
The first of these unwritten rules pertains to tolerance. In a political 
contest, as long as the contestants compete within the boundaries of 
the Constitution, each side must uphold the view that all individuals 
possess the same rights to govern and to submit if victory is held by 
another party. The second rule asserts that all parties must adhere to 
institutional forbearance; both the executive and legislative branches 
are equipped with a set of legal powers ordained within the constitution 
that checks and balances the powers of the other branch. For democracy 
to run effectively, each party needs to restrain from abusing its powers. 
These unwritten norms will erode once the elites choose to engage in 
politics akin to wars and utilize state institutions as weapons to win such 
wars. In a game meant forever to be played, the players in a democracy 
needs to prevent themselves from eliminating their opponents. Accord-
ingly, these norms are currently being ignored by US politicians.
The extreme polarization within the public has also threatened the 
US democracy. The dichotomy of Republicans and Democrats has in-
creasingly led to a division based on religious identity and race instead 
of policy. The commodification of identity in the 2016 election drove 
an irrational loyalty towards political parties, where the capacity, policy 
plans, and past experiences of candidates are sidestepped to give way 
to collective agitation. The illusion of identity (Sen 2007) is utilized to 
mobilize interests leading to violence is apparent under Donald Trump.
Talks on Trump’s impeachment that has started since mid-2019 may 
not have been surprising to both Levitsky and Ziblatt. Towards the end 
of the book, the authors create three possible scenarios in US politics 
that may occur after Trump’s election, one of which is the restoration 
of democracy due to Trump’s policies becoming highly unpopular or 
impeachment. Trump is considered the fourth president whose admin-
istration is subject to impeachment talks after Andrew Johnson (1868), 
Richard Nixon (1974), and Bill Clinton (1998). Later, the impeachment 
attempt failed in the Republican-controlled Senate. Levitsky and Ziblatt 
admit that the possibility that such a scenario could happen is slim. 
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Despite all that has happened, the current state of US democracy and 
all analyses presented by the authors are warnings that no regime is safe 
from the threat of democracy, including Indonesia.
Whether we realize it or not, the recent 2019 election showed that 
there was an identity hardening that triggered irrational loyalty and was 
prone to capitalization. Judging from the dynamics that occured, it can 
be seen that the 2019 election is a continuation of the dynamics of the 
presidential election in 2014 and the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial elec-
tion. Similar to what happened in America, voter loyalty is driven more 
by the issue of identity politics than criticism of the candidates’ visions 
and missions. Instead of arguing with ideas, political mockery between 
the supporters of both candidates dominated media coverage. Increased 
social media activity also opens up wider echo chambers for “buzzers”. 
Unfortunately, seen from the efforts to gain support, the capitalization 
of identity issues has no impact. This strategy is not able to reduce the 
number of undecided voters, let alone influence voters who have made 
their choices. It is not surprising that the electability and the number 
of undecided voters that appear in various poll releases do not show 
significant differences and changes. Following the election, there have 
not been any signs of a decrease in the capitalization of identity issues 
and it is likely that this will continue until the next election. We must 
understand that democracy in Indonesia has all indications of vulner-
ability to be infiltrated by demagogues: pragmatic elites, high levels of 
money flow in elections, increased social media activity as an alterna-
tive campaign space, and irrational voter loyalty due to the capitaliza-
tion of identity issues. If the United States of America, one of the oldest 
democracies, fails to protect itself from demagogues, Indonesia as a new 
democracy must certainly be more careful of the threat of democracy, 
especially if the threat is killing democracy from within.
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